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OUTSTANDING MAGAZINE ARTICLES RELATING TO
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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This weekly report presents digests of current magazine editorials and articles of special pertinence to U.S. foreign relations--but does not necessarily mirror over-all opinion.

This issue includes digests from the following magazines listed in the order in which they appear.

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DIVISION OF PUBLIC STUDIES

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BIG POWER CONFERENCE - Business Week, p. 7

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION - Collier's, p. 17

RUSSIA - New Leader, p. 10; Time, p. 15; Collier's, p. 17

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OUTSTANDING MAGAZINE ARTICLES RELATING TO

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

CURRENT HISTORY - June

"A Bipartisan Foreign Policy" - Norman A. Graebner

Pres. Eisenhower appears determined to avoid the partisan attacks on foreign policy which helped to weaken the preceding leadership. In the U.S. the task of defining and maintaining an able foreign policy is aggravated by distribution of powers between the Executive, Congress, and the public. Public policy, even if based on a clear understanding of the national interest, can become effective only if supported by Congress and public opinion. Without bipartisanship there is no clear method by which foreign policy can be brought into line with U.S. interests. Bipartisanship was reached in a limited field during the recent post-war years, although never applied to two troublesome areas, Palestine and China.

Despite his personal election triumph, Pres. Eisenhower can accomplish little in a sustained foreign policy without bipartisan support. It is obvious that he and Sec. Dulles understand the need for this support--evidenced by their appointments, such as Mr. Lodge to UN, by the inclusion of key Democrats in foreign policy conferences, and by the new President's continued adherence to the basic foreign policy which he endorsed as head of NATO, and again late in his campaign. Any changes in policy toward Europe or the Far East under the new administration have been matters of degree, not intention. Democratic foreign policy spokesmen have pointed out that their build-up of Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa in the past two years anticipated a move commensurate with Eisenhower's releasing of the Seventh Fleet. Further, many foreign policy observers, including Democratic leaders, have believed for many months that the time had arrived to demand more purposeful defense activity from W. Europe as a condition to further U.S. aid. Thus recent moves hardly comprise a new policy.

Prospects for future inter-party harmony on foreign policy under the Eisenhower Admin. still appear bright. It is even possible, in this realm at least, that he can effectively break the deadlock which has characterized Congress since Roosevelt's leadership was challenged in 1938. To accomplish this, he must have, as Allen Nevins suggested, both a plan and the courage to fight for that plan. Effective presidential leadership is the only guarantee against extensive partisanship in Congress.

CURRENT HISTORY (Contd.)

"The Reciprocal Trade Battle" - Mary K. Hammond

There is little doubt that from the viewpoint of strictly economic self-interest, and from more important over-all political strategy, the U.S. must liberalize its trade policies. It must be tackled in areas where possible action should be taken immediately to bridge the dollar gap and help bring about a healthier status to world economics. These areas include: 1) Much greater foreign investments. 2) Repeal of the "Buy American Act." 3) Repeal of legislation requiring that at least half of the shipments from U.S., financed by MSA, be carried in ships flying the American flag. 4) Greater off-shore procurement during the re-arming of Europe. 5) Greater customs simplification. 6) Greater imports.

If our policy is to strengthen the free world, economically, militarily and politically, we must abandon the quid pro quo mentality, if only from the standpoint of enlightened self-interest. It is highly unlikely that any of these problems will be tackled frontally in the immediate future. There was much in Pres. Eisenhower's April 7 speech to encourage belief that he would actively work for freer trade. Yet a disturbing feature was the administration's decision to seek only a single year's extension of the act. This makes it very difficult for foreign firms to make long-range plans. The President also proposed to use the year for a thorough re-examination of the country's economic foreign policy. In essence, the struggle has merely been postponed for a year. There have been two sweeping surveys since 1947, one headed by Gordon Gray and the other by Daniel W. Bell. Both came to the same conclusions. It seems unlikely that another survey can objectively reach a different conclusion.

THE REPORTER - June 23

"Boomers and Boomerangs"

Mr. Stassen's 56 "evaluators" of the MSA Program were mainly business men, most of whom had not had previous experience with foreign aid or foreign policy. Not all of them were able to take the two days' briefing before leaving to evaluate what the govt. had been doing in the foreign aid business. One of the ideas back of the project was that these men would come home boozing the MSA and impress home communities with its importance. But just as the Administration was deciding to build up MSA as clearinghouse for all aid programs, the chief evaluator recommended that most of Mr. Stassen's job be liquidated. Also, at the time of Italy's elections, the evaluator for Italy reported that no aid given by U.S. "will make any permanent improvement." Italy has many troubles, for no way has yet been found for the U.S., by giving aid, to make in another country the structural changes that the peoples' welfare demands. But aid--through the Allied Commission, then UNRRA, then the Marshall Plan--certainly has caused "permanent improvement" of very large dimensions, as production indices show.

THE REPORTER (Contd.)

No govt. program, certainly not MSA, should be immune from independent "evaluation" by experts. But there are lessons in this incident for the next evaluators: 1) They should be experts. 2) They should talk to other than Americans abroad. 3) Their trips should not be timed in countries where elections are being held. 4) They should maintain silence when they reach home.

"Japan: Westward the Course of Youth" - Harold Strauss

The tawdriness of democratic Japan is called Coco-Colonization and is blamed on Americans, but actually in large measure it springs from a widespread revulsion among young people against all things Japanese. They equate all traditional manners, customs, and art with the past, with defeat, and therefore with feudalism, nationalism and weakness. This attitude helps to explain some of the political paradoxes in Japan: that Japan is a loyal ally though many of its people are anti-American; that they will rearm if they must, but fear our hotheadedness if they do; that they crave U.S. loans and education but hate their impact on daily life; that they search for renewed power through technology but dream of quiescence and even seclusion. This inner conflict causes the question: how much good and how much harm have been done by American influence in Japan? On the credit side, there are huge scientific and economic gains, and some political improvements. The common people, especially farmers, are much better off materially. These are tangible benefits. But all this has cost something, even though the costs are intangible.

"Three Countries--and Us" (editorial by Max Ascoli)

The American who inquires about the politics of European democracies is in for an unpleasant time these days. Even if he is an isolationist, he is likely to be disturbed by the realization that his "go-it-alone" pattern of thinking seems to be a European fashion. He is subject to acute embarrassment when asked to explain our Administration's policies. Europeans are familiar with the causes of Administration difficulties in developing its own foreign policy, for they know by experience how bitter and devastating intraparty factionalism can be. But they cannot figure why the Administration puts so much emphasis on keeping together a hopelessly split party. It would be understandable to them if the Republicans' conquest of power had been the revolutionary culmination of a hard-fought class struggle.

The outlines of a U.S. policy, haltingly developed under the Truman Admin., never became fully articulate, nor was it forcefully expressed to fire the imaginations of people at home and abroad. A policy of inter-locking associations--ranging from federations to loose alliances, led but not bossed by the U.S.--has been in the making since end of the war. But nationalisms of the most obtuse variety raise extraordinarily strong obstacles to establishment of an inter-locking system of alliances. Yet this U.S. policy of alliances, each established for a definite, limited purpose, was and still is the only one that can prevent Communist enslavement of our Allies. It is a policy that puts a

THE REPORTER (Contd.)

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premium on both supranational unity and national self-reliance--the only policy that can tackle the difficulties of each nation by separating what can be done by supranational bodies and what is within the means of the nation principally concerned. There is no other way of draining the swamps of French and Italian politics.

The resistance of European politicians to dangerous novelties hardens these days when they look at internal U.S. politics. They see the Senate going all out for the Bricker amendment, and no longer fear that the U.S. may give to the world it is supposed to lead the example of yielding a shred of its national sovereignty. U.S. diplomacy, to be sure, goes on preaching, with the utmost bad grace, the cause of other peoples' integration. But how can this berating be taken seriously abroad when the Administration does not succeed in establishing any degree of integration among the branches of the U.S. govt.?

The policy of interlocking alliances is no dream. NATO shows that it works. NATO operates with a thoroughly inter-allied general staff led, but not bossed, by an American supreme commander.

AMERICA - June 20

"Jerusalem: A Cause of Aggression" (Current Comment)

While it might be the better part of prudence for the U.S. not to become too directly involved in controversies in the M. East, there is no excuse for the weak, wavering nature of the support we have given UN resolutions on the status of the Holy City. Col. W.A. Eddy, long with the diplomatic service in the M. East has stated that we should not hesitate before too late to rescue from present aggression the Holy City--the area wherein the UN pledged that nothing should be done to prejudice its international character. The aggression referred to was an "aggression against the UN," symbolized by the defiant statement last Dec. of Israeli Prime Min. Ben Gurion that Jerusalem is and will remain his capital. This despite the fact that in all UN resolutions on Palestine, reaffirmed in the Lausanne protocol May 12, 1949, and never repudiated by the world body, both Old and New Jerusalem are explicitly excluded from the jurisdiction of any one state.

"Trade With China: the Larger Issues" (Current Comment)

Sen. Mundt, subbing for Sen. McCarthy, released a list of 162 free-world ships that have made 264 trips to Red China. The U.S. imposed a complete embargo; other nations, more dependent on overseas trade, embargoed only certain strategic materials. Hence their trade is legal. They continue it because they need Chinese products and the profits from the carrying trade. Seagoing commerce is England's life-blood. Nevertheless, such trade helps the enemy as well as the allies. No

AMERICA (Contd.)

solution can be reached until the U.S. liberalizes its own foreign trade policies. The niggardly compromise renewal of the RTA Act is certainly no solution.

"Agreement on PW's" (Current Comment)

An armistice in Korea seems only a breath away and the mere fact that the Communists have signed agreement amounts to a victory for UN patience and persistence in upholding the principle of voluntary repatriation. The ideal application of this principle would, of course, have been immediate release of all balky POW's. An armistice on that basis would have been too much to hope for. As it is, we have the next best thing: an agreement providing utmost protection of POW's and guaranteeing eventual freedom to those who crave it.

U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT - June 19

"What Communists Win with a Truce"

China is the winner, U.S. the loser, in a truce now. Uneasy armistice is the most to expect. Big armies stay on either side of the old battle line, ready to go. Truce for China: a welcome breathing spell. Communists will use a cease-fire to freshen up their troops, rebuild N. Korea's Army, make it a match for S. Korea. Also, Chinese get a chance to relax, patch up things at home, where food is scarce, and the program to industrialize is way off schedule. There are political troubles, too. Pressure for trade with the West is sure to grow. Chinese are offering enticing markets. It's just what the Communists ordered--a chance to get goods and stir up trouble for the Allies at the same time. Truce for the US: a blind alley. No freedom to maneuver, to try for an armistice advantage in Asia. Allied build-up to match Communists is out. What is more likely is pressure to "get the boys home," cut down in Korea, try to keep S. Koreans in check. The enemy can really put the heat on now. He's got the most productive part of Korean industry and power, and can build it up while arguing over peace terms. The initiative is in his hands.

"Now It's a New 'cold war'"

The promise of a truce in Korea is being accompanied by rapid-fire developments that mean new headaches for the U.S. all around the world. The U.S. appears to be losing ground rapidly in the cold war. Almost everywhere, the initiative seems to be moving from American to Soviet hands. Molotov seems to Europeans to be putting our diplomats into baffled retreat. All through Europe, the U.S. position is weakened. Pressure inside each nation to cut loose from the U.S. alliance and go its own way is strengthened. As a result of the Soviet moves, these conclusions about the future are being drawn by many appraisers in Europe: The European Army, as a counter to Russian armed strength, is dead. NATO is faced with growing trouble. Europe's political leaders who have accepted the lead of the U.S. are in serious political trouble. Their days in office appear numbered.

U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT - (Contd.)

East-West trade is to grow toward prewar size. Even barriers against strategic shipments to Communist countries may be dropped. A Big Four meeting will be held to seek new deals with Russia.

What is really happening is that World War III, Communist style, is entering a new strategic phase. Armed uprising is to be held in abeyance. Men in the Kremlin are calling a halt to tough talk. Soft talk is taking place. Meanwhile, Communists can try again their "popular front" infiltration, build up their strength and wait for new opportunities.

HUMAN EVENTS - June 10

"Korea"

Few leaders on Capitol Hill privately deny that the Korean settlement represents a defeat, perhaps the first real frustrating defeat in American history. It is hard to conceal shame over the surrender of the POWs to what is obviously a Soviet-dominated commission. While there are various assurances that we will not sell out our Chinese Nationalist allies, there is little confidence that this will not occur. Those who have long wanted to "get out" of Korea and bring the boys home are deeply troubled by two aspects of the settlement: 1) It is still a UN truce and will probably be a UN peace. The desire of men like Taft is to keep us free from costly and dangerous entanglements arising from UN membership. What looms is an expensive Korean "rehabilitation" program and perhaps a vast Point IV spending spree in the whole Far East. 2) The Administration has not yet, but should ere long recognize the reality of the defeat and investigate the reasons thereof so that we can in the future avoid repetition. Congressional committees might well probe such matters, calling Gens. MacArthur, Van Fleet and Ridgeway to explain why real victory was not achieved--victory, for which there is no substitute.

BUSINESS WEEK - June 13

"Soviets Tighten Czech Leash"

The Czech currency "reform" is a prize example of Communist social engineering, practically wiping out all personal savings and raising the cost of living by 20% to 40%. This time Moscow may have gone too far, for resistance seems much greater than anything the Russians figured on. The squeeze play was probably intended as an answer to the U.S. policy of "liberation." By reducing industrial workers and free peasants--the main sources of potential resistance--to a state of hopelessness, the Russians could expect to stymie U.S. policy. The move also may be tied to Soviet plans for Germany. If the Russians are ready to withdraw from East Germany, it's pretty obvious that Moscow would first want to protect its flank in Czechoslovakia. Moscow's overall aim seems clear enough--to reduce Czech living standards, bring them down as quickly as possible to the Russian level. If the Russians have any idea about outright annexation, such a leveling

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would inevitably precede the move. Even if Soviet aims don't go this far, the squeeze play makes sense as an answer to U.S. liberation talk and as a preliminary to a big push for German unity. But if the move boomerangs, as it well may, the Russians would find their position in Czechoslovakia weaker instead of stronger.

"Truce in Korea"

In assessing the Korean struggle, most Americans will realize that what has been accomplished is an achievement without parallel. For the first time in history, the free world has checked armed invasion. Korea now represents a victory that can be accepted with honor. We will continue to seek the goal of a unified and independent state without letup, but in declaring that we will depend on peaceful means, the President made clear the great difference between communism and democracy. His emphasis on the principle that there cannot be independence without interdependence has decisively strengthened the U.S. position as leader of the free nations. This leadership will be further tested in the months to come. We must not be lulled into a sense of false security. Now that clamor for a meeting with the Russians will inevitably increase, we must have a positive formulation of new policies. Pres. Eisenhower has shown that our basic democratic principles will not be overthrown for the sake of expediency. He deserves the support of all Americans for his stand. If we are to meet the Russians, our real strength, as he pointed out, lies in a united alliance of the democracies.

"Strategy for a Cold Peace"

U.S. policy-makers know that the thaw in the cold war will be a slow and dangerous process at best. The bitter S. Korean opposition to the truce is probably an omen of the confusion and frustrations that lie ahead. Communists will take full advantage of all such differences in the Western camp. There is no reason to expect that any really important East-West agreements covering either Asia or Europe will come of the meetings. Nonetheless, the end result probably will be a less tense and quite different international atmosphere than we have known for the past five or six years. That is what the Soviet leaders seem to want, especially if they can get it without offering anything much beyond a Korean truce. But only very serious economic strains inside Russia, for which there is no real evidence yet, would be likely to force Moscow into a real peace pact with the West. Korea has paid off for the Chinese Reds but they have paid a heavy economic price, as has Russia.

At the Bermuda meeting, Pres. Eisenhower will do his best to stall off a meeting with the Russians as long as he can, and will concentrate on getting a common front on Germany. On Far East questions, he will have his hands full, e.g., trying to persuade the British and French to support the U.S. in blocking Red China's

BUSINESS WEEK (Contd.)

admission to UN, or at least to agree that the question should be kept out of the Korean political conference. Then the French will insist that they cannot continue to carry the Indochina burden. At Bermuda the U.S. is almost certain to drop a plan now being considered in Wash., whereby the Korean political conference will take up a package deal including a cease-fire in Indochina where the Communist price for settlement would certainly be too high.

Moscow is undoubtedly ready to join the West in a statement of peaceful intentions. It may offer, too, to open up the flow of trade and culture between East and West—probably the best we can hope for this year.

BARRON'S - June 15

"Bitter Truce"

A Korean truce, if it comes, will be a very bad one. Surely a good many Americans know this in their hearts. The justification for making peace now is that many months ago this country and its allies abandoned search for decisive victory; and to go on fighting a war of attrition means a needless sacrifice of American life; and that possibly we may get back those American POWs whom the Communists have not butchered. These are compelling reasons for ending the bloodshed and for hoping that in the end Mr. Rhee will bow to the inevitable.

Few will question the President's hard decision to liquidate the conflict. But little is gained and much is lost by refusal to admit the costs as well as gains. Militarily speaking, an armistice holds out large advantages to Communists. Chinese troops will be free to move southward to make further trouble off Formosa and in Indochina. And even to maintain the present line on the peninsula will presumably entail a heavy continuous U.S. commitment. Politically the truce will leave Korea truncated on a line that runs just 30 miles north of Seoul. It is argued that in establishing this line U.S. forces accomplished their "mission"—i.e., to stop aggression. But to stop aggression is not to liquidate it, and the fact is that UN did contemplate unifying and pacifying the country under the only legal govt. that exists. In his letter to Mr. Rhee, Pres. Eisenhower seems to have forgotten about this.

The final agreement signed at Panmunjom on POWs makes sorry reading in view of the millions of leaflets dropped behind enemy lines promising all POWs freedom of choice. Their fate now rests with a so-called "neutral" repatriation commission, including India which has favored the Communist cause. What kind of neutrality is this? Finally, the agreement allows Communist representatives to try to persuade the POWs to change their minds. No provision is made for counter-argument or even for freedom of debate. The conclusion is that the whole pressure of the present apparatus will be not to release the POWs into freedom, but to force them to return to their "fatherland."

BARRON'S (Contd.)

It is easy to blame all these unpalatable aspects on the UN or on perfidious Albion. We take little comfort in such oversimplification. To a peculiar degree, the Korean war has been an American show: Wash., not London, assumed leadership in the original intervention; and Wash., not London, recalled MacArthur and opened the way to negotiations. What the nation is now painfully discovering is that a negotiated settlement in this case is no substitute for victory, and must entail loss of legitimate political objectives. If and when the guns go silent, the Administration will find that its job is just beginning--to rebuild out of partial defeat and imperishable sacrifice a Far Eastern policy worthy of the American people.

FREEDOM & UNION - June

"Who Will Investigate These Three Red Agents?"

Three powerful agents are working for Moscow in the Atlantic democracies, particularly in the U.S. and Britain, and none is costing the Kremlin a ruble. 1) party politics, 2) the profit motive gone blind, 3) the principle of absolute national sovereignty. No investigating committee is inquiring into the work that these three are obviously doing for the Kremlin. Indeed, Moscow can rely on no one more than Sen. McCarthy to wink at everything that Mr. Party Politics, Mr. Profit Motive and Mr. National Sovereignty are now doing in the U.S. to aid communism. Where democracies are divided by national sovereignty, personally ambitious and demagogic politicians in each of them can thrive on attacks made and received across their national lines, such as those that are constantly erupting between the U.S. and Britain. But unite these democracies through a federal govt., and personal ambition persuades even the most demagogic politician never to say anything that might offend or alienate the citizens of any State in the Union since the only way to highest power is to build up a following in all parts of it.

When Atlantic democracies limit their national sovereignty by eliminating trade and currency barriers between them, there will continue to be many economic divisions among them, born of the profit motive. But the competitors for the rich market this Union will form will not be nations with flags wrapped around them, but corporations, many of whom will soon have stockholders and branches in every nation in the Union. Limit national sovereignty to the truly domestic affairs of the Atlantic democracies, eliminate it as regards their truly common affairs, govern the latter by the same democratic methods that govern the former--and then the struggle for markets on which Moscow counts for the destruction of freedom will end. The orthodox way to treat recurring eruptions in Atlantica is the same as those that witch-doctors use who would cure smallpox by covering with soft salve each pack as it comes while explaining they are too busy to seek for any hidden germ. Those who apply this treatment today are still called statesmen or practical men. They grow impatient with the "dreamers" who say: "The salve doesn't cure. The patient is getting worse. These eruptions come from the same germ. Let us remove it. Or try to." Happily the number of these dreamers is growing--but is it growing fast enough?

THE NEW LEADER - June 15

"No Peace for Korea" - (editorial)

The fate of Korea in the Fifties has been as shabby as that of Poland in the Forties and Czechoslovakia in the Thirties. Our Korean policy has been a mosaic of defeatism, with each new timidity leading inevitably to the next. Practically speaking, the U.S. has little choice but to accept the truce which our leaders have prepared. Our failure in Korea to achieve what might have been a monumental victory is disheartening, but a fact which, having willed, we must accept. But this failure should not lead us into isolationism and shortsightedness. "We must not "lose sight of the objective expressed by the UN for a united, independent and democratic Korea." If this objective is again thwarted by the Communists, we must continue to give the Korean Republic not only the economic aid pledged, but military aid also. In Formosa and Indochina, too, political reform, economic assistance and military aid must become part of a single policy of creating bastions of democracy. Such a policy requires more than a mutual-defense pact with Seoul. It requires, as it has ever since the Red conquest of China, a Pacific Pact as firm and explicit as NATO. Until a real Pacific Pact is concluded, East Asia will continue to invite Communist aggression. It goes without saying that Red China cannot be considered for a seat in the UN. Also, the truce should be no excuse to halt the buildup of our own armed forces. For if our present level of defense has been insufficient to beat back communism in little Korea, how can we ever meet the challenge of a growing world Communist empire?

"Moscow and Madrid" - (editorial)

The danger of a Moscow-Madrid pact is great, for the strategic advantages that the Soviets would derive from it are immense. 1) The friendship of a power that stands athwart the western entrance in the Mediterranean; 2) Spain's ability to supply such vital commodities as wolfram. Considering Peron's well-known affinity for Franco, and his own current efforts to sign an economic agreement with Moscow, he might be the logical broker between the latter and Madrid. Franco is enjoying his new-found popularity with the Russians. The earnest object of U.S. attentions, Franco is playing both ends against the middle. In a recent speech to a military audience that was deliberately kept out of the Spanish press, he promised to get "many times the amount that they (Russia and the U.S.) are now haggling over." In the face of these shameful maneuvers, the U.S. should tell Franco to go hang. We should have done it long ago.

"Unity and Reciprocity" - Wm. Henry Chamberlin

Unity among the non-Communist powers is a political, military and moral asset which no American in his right mind would throw away. Disruption of this is probably the main purpose of the Kremlin's new conciliatory manner. Yet, as we saw during W. War II, unity can be purchased at too high a price--as in the case of Stalin's demands that spelled injustice for the Poles and others of

THE NEW LEADER (Contd.)

E. Europe, in order to maintain "unity" with the USSR. The lesson from this experience is that maintaining Western unity is a responsibility that rests on other nations besides the U.S. Some naive Americans who favor this or that foreign nation, assume that if we give in unconditionally to Great Britain on Far Eastern policy, to France on German rearmament, all will be well. But unity loses meaning and content if its maintenance involves loss of national honor or abandonment of the very conditions of effective resistance to the Soviet threat.

The moral is that unity must be accompanied by general acceptance of the principle of reciprocity--which has not prevailed in the handling of the Korean crisis. The U.S. should make every reasonable effort to hold the anti-Communist coalition together. But it cannot make all the effort. Even so powerful a country as the U.S. cannot, in the long run, help people unable or unwilling to help themselves.

CHRISTIAN CENTURY - June 17

"Armistice in Korea!" - (editorial)

As this article goes to press, it is not clear what course Syngman Rhee will follow if a truce is declared in Korea. He has threatened to go on fighting alone but it is doubtful if he would be able to make good on this threat. It is difficult not to sympathize with Dr. Rhee's position but there are certain things to keep in mind about the S. Korean leader's attitude. 1) He demanded from Pres. Eisenhower a free hand to launch another war, and the President was justified in warning him against "reckless adventure." 2) Under the truce, S. Korea will be larger than it was in June 1950. 3) The mass of Korean people want no more war. 4) The commitments made by the U.S. to help South Korea hold much promise for a better future for that nation.

"Is American Policy in the Near East Shifting?" - (editorial)

The speech which Sec. Dulles made on his return from the M. East could have "sensational" implications, but the same could have been said about other speeches of the Secretary of State and these have been "interpreted into innocuousness." Mr. Dulles was very candid in admitting that U.S. policy by favoring Israel had lost the goodwill of the Arabs. He hinted at several places that there would be shifts in foreign policy. The direction in which these changes point is toward a friendlier relation with the Arab states. "We hope the Secretary's hints work out into active American policy."

NEWSWEEK - June 22

"Diplomacy Takes Over" - Ernest K. Lindley

With a cease-fire in Korea, how well prepared is U.S. diplomacy to shoulder the greater burden? We have a President and Sec. of State with unusual grasp of world affairs. The President's high tribute to Mr. Dulles last week was timely, for the Secretary has not only

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been a target for various Republicans in Congress but has lacked firm support of some members of the White House staff. In key positions are other men of long experience and ripe judgement in international affairs, including Allen Dulles, W. Bedell Smith, and the Chiefs of Staff. And State Dept. has a corp of first-rate career man. But to give the impression and State Dept. is in good shape would be misleading. The wreckage of VOA and related activities is being detached. Probably efficiency and morale are at the lowest ebb within living memory. Grotesqueries in the name of "security" have subjected the U.S. Govt. to derision at home and abroad. These are among the consequences of the White House policy of appeasing McCarthyism. To say we have seized the initiative vis-a-vis Moscow deceives only ourselves. Far from winning it, it is evident that even our leadership of the free world has suffered loss of prestige and influence.

The brighter side of the picture is Pres. Eisenhower's utterances on international affairs--generally applauded in the free world. Sec. Dulles has done excellent groundwork in many directions. The proof that the U.S. Govt. wanted a truce rather than a broadening of war has been vastly reassuring to our allies. Prime Min. Nehru's commendation of the President was significant. Nehru has revealed a better understanding of U.S. policy since Sec. Dulles' visit. Although in a real sense Moscow is exercising the initiative now. It is using it in a direction which superficially is encouraging. The first task of our diplomacy is now to try to get a meeting of minds with our principal allies on terms of adjustment with Moscow and Peking. These should be designed to test whether Communists really are ready to make agreements which hold at least the promise of a period of international stability. One test is whether, and on what conditions, they are willing to permit unification of divided countries: Austria, Germany, and Korea.

"The Periscope"

Wrong Steers Some influential, but ill-informed, S. Americans are unhappy about the coming visit of Milton Eisenhower. In Latin countries, Presidents over the years have made a practice of handing soft, high-paying govt. jobs to incompetent relatives. Unaware of Milton's distinguished reputation, these skeptics feel the President is slighting them by dispatching a "mere brother."

"Rhee Tangles Truce Talks with Adamant Unity Stand"

In spite of Syngman Rhee's continuing hostility, Wash. officials remained confident that he would ultimately have to "face the realities" and accept the truce. Some saw in his feeler for an immediate mutual-security treaty a search for a face-saving formula which would permit him to back down. But they were concerned by the effect such a treaty might have on the Communists, if it were signed. The realities which Rhee would have to face, as Wash. sees them, were: 1) The U.S. is

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opposed to unification of Korea by force. 2) It would be mass suicide for the ROK army to fight on alone. 3) By repudiating U. S. policy and continuing to fight, the ROK's would become in effect enemies of the UN and could hardly expect that the U.S. would continue to provide their supplies. What would happen if Rhee were still adamant when the armistice was signed, Wash. could only guess. "From the armistice on, we'll sort of have to play it by ear," one official admitted. The first 72 hours would tell the story. Either the ROK division would pull back $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles, as the truce agreement provides, or...No responsible authority cared to predict the alternative.

THE NATION - June 13

"The Shape of Things" - (editorial)

No matter what lies ahead, the agreement in Korea is the best news since the Germans surrendered. The UN can rightly assert that aggression was defeated by the collective action of most of its members. Settlements with Communists can be reached through negotiation and mutual concession. Skeptics should not forget that the final decision of POWs represented the sacrifice by the Chinese and N. Koreans of one of their most stubbornly held positions. Now that the operation of the armistice or the political conference to follow will be easy. Syngman Rhee's capacity for mischief is as great as his incapacity to drive the Chinese out of Korea single-handed. In the political negotiations the Administration will have to regard the wishes of other powers with immense stakes in the Far East. Provided the U.S. permits wide discussion of Asian issues, the failure of the N. Korean aggression and the terrible destruction that accompanied it should incline the Communist leaders to agree to a let-live peace.

"New Anti-Israel Policy?" - J. Alvarez del Vayo (Paris)

From the beginning, French diplomacy has been skeptical about prospects of establishing MEDO. Much earlier than Mr. Dulles, France had come to the same conclusion that creation of a MEDO would have to be postponed because the Arabs are "so engrossed with their quarrels with Isreal and with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet communism." But French observers are convinced that Wash. has not given up its plans for Near and M. East security and that what is happening now is a readjustment of previous ideas and tactics, following particularly Turkish advice. It seems, in fact, that Ankara was the real center of interest in Mr. Dulles' visit to 12 countries. Historically, Turkey is in a favorable position to exercise its influence throughout that area. Turkish diplomacy, which played so important a part in bringing the Balkan pact into existence, realizes that the problem of the Arab states is quite different. The three members of the Balkan pact had already achieved more or less internal stability. In the Arab states nothing is stable or strong. The

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THE NATION (Contd.)

Turks opine that the most important thing to do is to try to concentrate Arab distrust and hate exclusively on Israel, diverting it if possible from Britain and U.S. In their view Isreal might also be brought into MEDO but later and not as the "protege" of the U.S.

In Ankara officials frankly told Mr. Dulles that Turkey had concluded that participation by the Arab states in any defense organization was unlikely for the foreseeable future. They recommended elasticity, subtlety, and patience, a new approach aimed at appeasing the Arab countries by spending money there and by convincing them that the U.S. would never sacrifice them under pressure by the powerful forces in America engaged in promotion and aid of Isreal. U.S.-British rivalry in the area makes it difficult for the French to avoid annoying Americans by taking the side of the British and vice versa. French officials are worried by the Dynamism behind the U.S. effort to assume leadership in the M. East. They know that there is a point at which Britain must stand firm: it cannot abandon entirely its hold on Suez--the last strategic route in the defense of what is left of the old Empire. Contrary to what has often been charged, Russians are not carrying on inflammatory propaganda against Britain among Arab nationalists. They probably prefer the presence of British military forces, which are there exclusively to protect British interests, to control by the U.S., which would mean transforming the M. East into a strong military base against the USSR.

THE NEW YORKER - June 20

"Letter From Washington" - Richard Rovere

Korea: Syngman Rhee's behavior since he received Pres. Eisenhower's eloquent appeal suggests that he may really be serious about going it along, and as long as there is any reason to believe in his seriousness, the conclusion of an armistice is unthinkable. Rhee's attitude has produced some sobering thoughts, but there is a feeling in Washington that, one way or another, his obstinacy will be overcome or circumvented. Meanwhile, Seoul will endure more bombing, the UN forces will suffer more deaths, and the Russians will make more hay.

In some ways, the truce terms are more conciliatory than those offered by the Democratic Administration. While the present prisoner-exchange proposal does not violate the principle of no involuntary repatriation, it yields to the Communists the right to employ various forms of persuasion on POWs and it recognizes two satellite govts. as neutrals. Furthermore, the prospect of Peiping's entry into the UN seems to be implicit in the current offer. But in terms of the original objectives set by the UN and the U.S., the Communists' acceptance of our truce proposals is an acceptance of our victory.

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TIME - June 22

"Cold War--The Thaw"

Russia is now bent on thawing out the cold war. All along the globecircling seam where the West and Communism rub together abrasively, the stagnant air of cold war began to stir with Kremlin gestures of concession, of adjustment, even of retreat. The new sequence of actions creates a new diplomatic atmosphere, requiring new diplomatic responses. The Kramlin's new bosses acted with suppleness and skill--their maneuvering was carefully planned, and showed a cunning recognition of ways to achieve substantial effects in the West with means which neither cost them much nor relaxed their grip on power. It was all neatly timed. One example of Russia's current shrewdness: some of the concessions which the West might demand in the name of Germany and Austria were freely given by the Communists last week to the Germans and Austrians themselves, so that the West might not claim credit for extracting the concessions. Russia in this way stands to win a spurious credit abroad for unilaterally relaxing the cold war. The West has yet to find a way to counter it.

NEW REPUBLIC - June 22

"Washington Wire"

Ike's anti-book burning speech at Dartmouth sounded fine. But who is burning the books? Why, the State Dept. in its libraries abroad is black-listing U.S. authors. An order to stop this would have been even more eloquent than Ike's speech. U.S. position in Europe is sadly weakening. Mc scow has taken away the diplomatic initiative from Dulles. At home, Congress has shown that the slogan "trade not aid" is not much more than a slogan, while reckless statements of individual Congressmen reduce the benefits of Eisenhower foreign aid. Above all, U.S. prestige has plummeted with Europe's prestige increasing by its frightened comparison of McCarthyism to early stages of its own Fascism and Hitlerism. What really did the trick, many feel, was the fantastic Cohn & Schine visit. The only thing to point out in regard to the Korean truce talks is that Eisenhower has accepted the Truman-Acheson "peace-with-out victory" policy and that this is now supported by Republicans who would have impeached Acheson for proposing it.

"Is the UN Expendable?" ~ (editorial)

Taft's Cincinnati speech was damned on all sides as a reversion to isolationism. The speech, to be sure, was poorly phrased and miserably timed. It still deserved better treatment. Taft did not attack the UN. He simply reiterated that, as it is constructed today, the UN is constitutionally incapable of collective action. Many internationalists, from Lippmann to the World Federalists, will endorse Taft's diagnosis, and millions of Americans share his sense of frustration. His weakness was not in his diagnosis but in his inability to suggest any practicable cure. He could not do better than to review the downfall of the League of Nations which he supported as a young man; and to reflect on its lessons for today. Two conflicting doctrines of collective security and

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NEW REPUBLIC (Contd.)

universalism divide the UN today, in the light of UN's record in Korea. Precisely the same debate divided the League after its inadequate effort to defeat Italy. It was too late, of course, for reform. Churchill understood this, backing the League as it existed, firm in the belief that it was a useful instrument for defense of the status quo.

There is, of course, little in common between 1937 and 1953. But the pressures are the same and the results may be the same. It is easy to scorn a world organization whose SC offers Russia a veto power, and whose GA provides one vote apiece for Luxembourg and the U.S. The fact remains that a way has been found to bypass the veto in the GA and that, further, the opinions of the small nations serve as a useful check. Beyond this, the deep-felt faith of millions in many lands in the UN is too precious an asset to be roughly handled or lightly thrown away. It may be that regional pacts are necessary to bolster UN. But the fact remains that many independent nations will not join military alliances outside the UN. Yet these nations may be decisive in the balance between Communist and democratic countries. Of course, collective security worked imperfectly in Korea. But we cannot cast aside the UN for all time because in its earliest years its members are too unaware of their duties, or too hard-pressed by domestic difficulties, to carry their share of collective resistance.

The UN may prove invaluable as a meeting ground between the West and Asia rather than between the West and Russia. Precisely for this reason we must study the very real difference in approach of Asia and the West toward the UN. For the Asian nations believe in the UN primarily as an instrument of mediation; the West holds that the forcible repression of aggression is the heart of the Charter. No time can be lost in determining what is best for the U.S. and peace.

COLLIER'S - June 27

"A New Religion Rising in Asia" - Peter Kalischer
Caodaism, the world's newest religion, "has everything--
everything good from all the great religions"--according to its
pope. French govt. officials say that Caodaism has even more.
Its 1.5 million faithful followers comprise one of the few native
groups that have both the will and strength to battle the Communist
Viet Minh in Indochina. A Caodaist army 18,000 strong has turned
nearly 2,000 square miles of southern Indochina into an anti-
Communist oasis, freeing badly needed French Union forces to fight
elsewhere. "Caodaism's aim," the pontiff said, "is much the same
as America's. We seek to unite all people in a universal brother-
hood. Communism is a destructive force and we must fight it. Asia
must march with America. If we leave it to the French and British,
we've lost the game."

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COLLIER'S (Contd.)

"Mao Be So, Mao Be Not" - (editorial)

The daily press did not show much interest in the speculative study of Chinese-Soviet relations after the most recent council meeting of NATO. NATO experts who prepared the study emphasized some potential frictions which could cause trouble in the Communist paradise. They existed when Stalin was alive. It can hardly be an accident, however, that no one paid any great attention to them until Malenkov became dictator. The NATO study predicts of future relations between the Communist giants that: rivalries may arise over direction of certain revolutionary movements, notably the activities of the Japanese and Korean Communist parties, a leadership of which might be claimed by either Russia or China; that Chinese communism may have ambitions of national expansion on its own account, particularly in Far East countries, which may not always coincide with the plans of USSR. The study points out other possible sore spots which are more specific and immediate.

We do not suggest that the differences of personality and technique will cause a war between USSR and China. But if Malenkov is the tyrant he seems to be, the chance cannot be ruled out that he might goad Mao to the point where Mao would choose independence rather than continued subjection, and thus alter the picture of world diplomacy. This does not mean that the U.S. and its allies can afford to relax. But we trust that our govt. leaders are weighing present events against the background that the NATO study provides. They might come up with some valuable clues to Russian policy.

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